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Female employment rates in Russia have declined substantially since the end of the Soviet 
period. At the same time, there has been pronounced change in policies enabling women to 
balance work and family, or “familial policies.” The availability of child care has contracted 
sharply, and long maternity and parental leaves have been introduced.  This paper describes 
these changes within the context of Russia in transition, and explores the effect of child care 
and leave policy on women’s employment using the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring 
Survey. We conclude that, over the longer-term, women are more likely to remain employed 
if they work for enterprises which provide child care and maternity leaves.  Yet new, private 
enterprises are less likely to provide such leaves, painting a somewhat bleak picture of the 
long-term employment prospects for women in Russia. 
Keywords:  Russia, transition, maternity/parental leave, child care, women’s 
employment.   
JEL codes:  J22, P23, P36
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Introduction 
 The Soviet period in the Russian history is traditionally characterized as a period of 
high female labour force participation. While female employment in Russia still remains 
relatively high compared with many other countries, the position of women in the Russian 
labor market has deteriorated dramatically in the post-Soviet period. The number of 
employed women has decreased by 22 percent, from 39.1 million in 1990 to 30.5 million in 
1998.1 Part of the fall is due to a decline in overall employment.  Russia has changed from a 
country with close to universal employment during the Soviet area to one of the lower 
employment developed countries:  the percentage of those between 15 and 64 employed in 
Russia was 58.6 percent in 2001, lower than the EU-15 average of 64.2 percent or the US at 
62.4 percent (Natalia Smirnova, 2004).  The brunt of the decline in employment has been 
borne by women:  72 percent of the unemployed were women in 1993, and 64 percent in 
1998.2    
Several explanations exist for the decline in female employment.  One is that, after 
the elimination of the requirement for compulsory employment at the beginning of transition, 
many workers voluntarily exited the labour force. Another is that privatization and need to 
eliminate excess labour increased tensions in the labor market and pushed out traditionally 
vulnerable groups, including women with children. With ineffective enforcement of laws 
establishing job protection for women, and insufficient national mechanisms for ensuring that 
those rights are obeyed, including weak court and pre-court case resolution systems and trade 
unions, combined with the dramatic decline in economic welfare in all the countries of the 
former Soviet bloc, the negative effect of privatization was most keenly felt by women.  
There is now a fairly extensively literature on changes in the Russian labor market during the 
                                                 
1 Figures on women as a percentage of the unemployed derived from a Survey conducted by Centre for Labour 
Market Studies (CLMS) in Moscow in 1999 within the framework of Russian- Canadian Project "Women and 
Labour Market Reform in Russia," which was funded by the Canadian International Development Agency and 
administered by Carleton University, Ottawa. It was conducted in October 1999 in five Russian regions: 
Moscow, Kirov, Murmansk, Nizhny Novgorod, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Area (Salekhard and Urengoi). 
Survey participants included heads of enterprises, employees and trade union representatives of the same 
enterprises and organizations. A total of 278 enterprises and employers were surveyed (about 50 in each of the 
regions and 77 in Moscow and Moscow region) with total of 2213 employees and 131 trade union leader.  
2 CLMS, 1999 
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transition period (see, for example, Rostislav. I. Kapelushnikov, 2001; Katarina Katz, 2002;  
Ann-Mari Sätre Ahlander, 2001; Smirnova, 2004; Hartmut Lehmann and Jonathan 
Wadsworth, 2000; Anna Lukyanova, 2003; Louise Grogan, 2000), which explores these 
factors among others. 
Yet, with a few exceptions (such as Michael Lokshin, 1999; Judith R McKinnen, 
2004) the existing literature on Russian labor markets neglects the possible role of family 
policy in explaining these changes.  This is despite a relatively large literature showing that 
policies towards women with children in Western Europe and North America do indeed 
affect women’s labor market participation.3  The neglect of family policy is unfortunate since 
policies towards families, particularly state support for women with children, have changed 
dramatically in the post-Soviet period. Family support systems in Russia at the onset of 
transformation were widely available and tended to be generous and comprehensive. Most 
family programs were designed by the central government but delivered through state 
enterprises, agricultural collectives, and local governments.  Numerous programs, including 
child care and leave provisions, were attached to the workplace. Family policies supported 
women’s participation in the labour force, but also made employment the main access route 
to child care and related services, as is the case in countries with conservative welfare 
regimes. With transformation, however, all this has changed. 
The 1990s and early years of the 21st century have seen fundamental changes in child 
care arrangements, job protection for (pregnant) women, and maternity/parental leave 
policies in Russia.  Familial policies have been introduced to encourage women to have 
children and stay home with them.  There has been a movement from Soviet-style enterprise-
level provision of services to a more Western European, social insurance model, where the 
government collects social insurance or social security premiums and pays out maternity or 
parental or other benefits.  Yet these new systems coexist with Soviet-era enterprise 
provision, and a hard neo-liberal private sector sometimes offering informal contracts and no 
benefits at all.  The aim of this paper is, first, to describe these complex changes and, second, 
to investigate the effect of these changes on women’s employment.   
                                                 
3 See, e.g., OECD 1990, 2001; Kammerman and Kahn 1991a, 1991b; Wennemo 1994; Ruhm and Teague 1995; 
Gauthier 1996; Gornick, Meyers and Ross 1997; Leira 1992, 1998; Lewis 1998; Bruning & Plantenga 1999; 
Moss and Deven 1999; Ferrarini 2003.  
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Russia in Transition 
Three sets of factors underlie current Russian policy towards women as workers and mothers.  
The first is broad economic and demographic factors.  Transition introduced not only markets 
to Russia, but also unemployment, job insecurity, and rising income inequality and radically 
worse labor market prospects for male workers with low education and declining-industry 
skills. Superimposed on these economic and political realities was and is a demographic 
crisis of extremely high abortion and mortality rates and very low fertility rates. The 
country’s total fertility rate, which was around two lifetime births per woman from the late 
1960s through the early 1980s, as a result of deliberate pro-natalist policies, dropped steeply 
after 1987, falling to 1.4 births per woman in 1994 (Goskomstat of Russia, 2002).  Most 
recent United Nations Human Development Report data puts the Russian birthrate at 1.1 over 
the 2000 to 2005 period.4 In 2000, there were 70 percent more abortions than live births 
(Grogan and Julie Horrocks, 2005).  At the same time, male life   plummeted from 62.2 
percent in 1984 to 57.6 percent in 1994 (Goskomstat of Russia 2002), although it seems to 
have recovered slightly to 60.7 years in 2002.5  These demographic and macroeconomic 
factors are continually in the background, conditioning Russian policy and legislation. 
 Russia is not unique in experiencing problems.  Russia’s particular response to the 
demographic and economic crisis is shaped by Russian values.  Former Soviet leader Mikhail 
Gorbachev made headlines in 1987 when he said perestroika offered Soviet women what 
they really wanted – the chance to stay at home with their children (UNICEF 1999).  Yet he 
was voicing sentiments shared by many Russian men.  1994 World Values Survey data cited 
by Heather Antecol (2003) found that 76 percent of Russian men agreed or strongly agreed 
that preschool children suffer in their mother is working, and 87 percent agree that being a 
housewife is as fulfilling as working for pay - higher levels of agreement than in any other 
                                                 
4 http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/cty/cty_f_RUS.html, accessed April 28, 2005 
5 United Nations Human Development Report (2005), accessed April 28, 2005. 
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European country surveyed, or the US and Canada.6  A 1999 survey carried out by the Centre 
for Labour Market Studies in Moscow that interviewed 278 managers found 88 percent of 
employers preferred to hire men (when asked about specific positions, for example, 
receptionist, more employers had a preference for women).  Of that 88 percent, 23.4 cited 
higher productivity and 11.4 percent fewer associated costs as the reason for their preference.  
Women’s child care leave was singled out as particularly costly.7  Put together, these various 
snapshots paint a consistent picture of Russia perhaps the most traditional of all of Western 
developed countries in terms of male attitudes towards gender roles.    
 The economic and demographic crisis, along with Russian values, shapes the Russian 
leadership’s policy priorities.  Yet, as has been argued by, for example, Sylvia Walby (2004), 
a country’s gender regime – the way in which gender roles are structured – is path dependent.  
Put simply, where you start matters.  Russian policy is constrained by the Soviet legacy. 
Under the Soviet regime, social services such as child benefits, maternity provisions, family 
allowances, child care services, and sanatoria (health resorts) were provided by enterprises, 
which functioned as “micro-welfare states.”  Employment was the primary, often the sole, 
means by which people could access social services.  Child care is a clear and well-
documented example.  There are two main forms of child care in Russia:  nurseries for 
children up to the age of 3, and kindergartens for 4 to 6 year olds.  Children start school at 
age seven.  During the Soviet era, there was only a very minimal taxpayer-funded 
government run kindergarten system.  Child care institutions were seen as part of the 
educational system.  However they were mostly provided by state enterprises.  Because 
                                                 
6 The sole exception is 77 percent agreement in Hungary that preschool children suffer if their mother works for 
pay.  By way of contrast, agreement for these statements in the US is less than 50 percent for preschool children 
suffer and 45 percent for being a housewife is as fulfilling (Antecol, 2003, p. 33). 
7 Centre for Labour Market Studies, 1999. 
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employment was near universal, all children had access to pre-school institutions through a 
parent’s workplace.8  
Transition saw the emergence of both privatized, formerly public, enterprises and 
newly created private enterprises.  The former state enterprises often initially did not change 
anything in their operation except the official form of ownership, and inherited extensive 
social infrastructure from the Soviet period.  However the micro-welfare state model proved 
to be unsustainable in the face of increased domestic and international competition.  
Enterprises minimized production costs by reducing their provision of the social services, 
including child care. The percentage of children in child care facilities collapsed in the initial 
part of the transition period – for example, the percentage of children attending nurseries 
declined from 26 percent in 1989 to 14 percent in 1992.  The number of preschool 
institutions declined from 87.9 in 1990 to 53.2 thousand in 2000.  To some extent, enterprise 
level provision has been replaced by government provision, as enterprises have transferred 
their social infrastructure to local governments.  However there are still gaps in provision:  in 
2001, just under 40 percent of 4 to 6 year olds attended kindergarten.9
 The void left by the withdrawal of state enterprises has not been filled by the private 
sector.  Less than one percent of Russian children are cared for in a privately-owned child 
care centre.10  Newly created enterprises, facing an unstable economy and lacking a pre-
existing infrastructure, often utilize informal contracts to avoid obligations to provide social 
benefits, as will be elaborated later in the subsequent sections of the paper.  The 1999 law on 
the foundations of obligatory social insurance shifted the responsibility for paying child 
benefits, family allowances, maternity and other leaves away from the enterprises to regional 
social insurance funds. In 2000 responsibility for providing preschool, kindergarten 
education shifted to local governments.  Yet, as we discuss below, substantial gaps in service 
provision remain.  
                                                 
8 In the Russian system, child care institutions are often referred to as "preschool educational institutions," and 
are seen as a part of an educational system. Therefore this paper uses terms "child care" and "preschool" 
institutions interchangeably.  
9 Calculated by authors from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey. 
10 Calculated by authors from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, 2001 survey. 
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These three features of transition:  economic and demographic crisis, traditional 
Russian male values, and an unsustainable system of enterprise level provision, created a 
perfect environment for the growth of a traditional policy towards families and children.  If 
women could only be persuaded to stay at home and look after their children, it would solve 
economic problems (men could fill jobs left vacant by women) and demographic problems 
(more children).  It would mesh with widely held beliefs (at least, widely held by men) about 
the appropriate role of women.  And the provision of social services by women would relieve 
enterprises and governments of the pressure to provide services, creating cost savings.  In the 
next section we will show how maternity and parental leaves progressively expanded during 
the transition period, encouraging women to, at least temporarily, leave the workforce.  We 
will then examine the effect of family policies on women’s employment.  Yet in all of the 
analysis, one thing must be borne in mind.  However strong the pro-family ideology, 
women’s actions are shaped and constrained by economic reality.  In traditional-values 
Russia, 97 percent of men agree or strongly agree that most women have to work these days 




At the beginning of the 1990s, a number of the family and labour laws which were drafted 
during the Soviet period were still in force. Russia had a long-standing tradition of employer-
paid maternity leaves at full salary. Traditionally, entitlement to maternity leave has been 
linked to employment.  In 1993, the leave was extended to women who are laid off during 
pregnancy; in 1995, it was extended to full-time students; and in 1997 it was extended to 156 
days for multiple births.   
 At the present time, there are two major types of leaves: maternity and “parental” 
leave. Maternity leaves normally last 140 days (70 days before and 70 days after the 
delivery).  Mothers with at least one year of employment receive 100 percent of their regular 
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salary during their maternity leave with a maximum total monthly payment of 85 times the 
minimum monthly wage (set at 450 roubles or about $14 per month in 200211).12   
 Under the Soviet regime, it was possible for women to take “child care” leaves after 
their maternity leave entitlement ended.  Child care leave was extended up to 36 months in 
1991. In 2002 parental leave replaced child care leave and, while the name changed, the 
length of time people could claim benefits remained unchanged.  While on leave, a parent 
will receive a leave payment of 500 roubles (about $17) per month  until the child reaches 1.5 
years old13 and 50 roubles (about $1.7) per month during the age of a child from 1.5 to 3 
years old.14 The leave is still normally taken by women, though if a father or other family 
member wishes to take any part of this leave, he may (with the written permission of the 
mother). Women have an opportunity to work part-time or from home while taking the leave, 
or to take the leave in parts (with breaks) with the right to return to the same position.  
The main condition for taking leave is access to social insurance by a mother, which 
(except, for the self-employed, farmers and students) is provided by employer. Up until 2001, 
maternity leaves and the former child care leave were paid by the employer.  According to 
the new labour code, benefits are paid out of regional “social insurance funds” until the child 
reaches 1.5 years old.  The leave benefits from child's 1.5 to 3 years old are still paid by the 
employer from the payroll funds.15
Employers, instead of paying benefits directly, were required to pay a new, “single 
social tax,” or “unified social tax” amounting to 35.6 percent of an employee’s earnings up to 
100,000 roubles (around $3,500 US), 20 percent of earnings between 100,000 and 300,000 
roubles, and lower amounts on higher earnings. In other words, if an enterprise paid an 
employee 50,000 roubles per year, it would pay an additional 17,800 roubles into the social 
                                                 
11 Budget Discussion for 2002. Social Policy (Source is in Russian). 
http://www.socspb.ru/press/news_sp/2001/10/01/events2562/ 
12 http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/2004-2005/europe/russia.html 
13 1995 Federal Law on State Benefits to Individuals with Children (with amendments made in 2002) 
14 2001 Presidential Decree #136 
15 Gusov K. 2003. Commentary to the 2002 Labour Code of the Russian Federation. Moscow: Prospect.  
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insurance fund (KPMG, 2004).16  In turn, the social insurance fund pays for employees’ 
maternity, parental and other leaves, as well as other pension and other benefits.   
 Yet a change in gender regime is rarely straightforward, and new private sector 
employers have resisted both Soviet-style enterprise-level provision of benefits, and the new 
social insurance funds.  Employers often associate costs with extended paid leaves, which in 
turn impedes female employment. As noted in the previous section, research has found that 
employers prefer to hire men.  More than 50 per cent of employers surveyed by the Centre 
for Labor Market Studies in 199917 indicated that the parental leave would decrease women's 
attractiveness as employees. Since the social insurance fund has been paying the maternity 
and parental leave allowances, the costs of leave are now mostly associated with replacement 
workers (hiring, letting them go at the end of the leave), but lingering perceptions may still 
remain.   
 In practice, enterprises can resist the gender regime by finding ways to reduce their 
obligations to provide benefits, through utilization of gaps in the legislation, exploiting the 
lack of law enforcement mechanisms, or not hiring women.18 To borrow a term from the 
taxation literature, the practice of newly privatized firms towards workers rights is more like 
“avoidance”, that is, attempting to minimize provision while mostly staying within the law. 
The practice of the newly emerging private enterprises, however, is more like “evasion”, 
using illegal means to get around providing benefits.   
The most common evasion mechanism is the practice of "informal contracts," when 
employees (both men and women), in return for declining legally-stipulated social benefits, 
are promised and paid “shadow” salaries much (numbers vary - from twice as much to 20 - 
literally depending on the enterprise) higher than the ones officially stated in the labor 
contract. The information about the wages and salaries is confidential given its character 
                                                 
16 http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/2004-2005/europe/russia.html 
17 Centre for Labour Market Studies, 1999 
18 Wadsworth and Lehmann (2000) found that Russian women were less likely than men to be in new jobs, 
unlike say Britain, where the opposite is true. 
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when a person gets hired. However, quite often an employee has only a very blurry idea of 
the amount of the compensation to be received every month.19
 The significance of informal agreements and their impact on female employment 
cannot be underestimated. Within the general legislative framework around family created by 
the government, in the conditions of poor law enforcement, "the actual terms are being 
negotiated at the individual level directly between employers and employees. This situation 
puts many parents in a poor bargaining position, especially working women, who are still the 
primary users of family leaves" (UNICEF 1999: 54). 
 The reason why enterprises would offer informal contracts are obvious:  paying salary 
for employees on leave (under the old system) or paying 35.6 percent of payroll into a social 
insurance fund (under the new system), as well as providing a host of other employment 
rights, is expensive.  But why do workers agree to these conditions?  There is something in 
informal contracts for employees:  when enterprises evade the single social tax, employees 
evade income tax, which at 13 percent (KPMG, 2004) is low by North American standards, 
but still not trivial.  Eligibility for some benefits, such as parental leave, depends solely on 
whether or not you have employment, not how much you get paid, so why should anyone pay 
more premiums for the same benefits? To the extent that informal contracts are being offered 
by new firms, workers may accept informal working conditions to enter a dynamic, growing, 
private sector.  Or, in an economy of high and persistent unemployment, people may simply 
have no alternatives.  Trading off benefits for increased salary will be particularly attractive 
for younger workers, those in good health, and those without family responsibilities and, 
because they are less likely to take advantage of maternity and parental leaves, men – just as, 
in the US, young, unattached, healthy workers may choose the cheapest, no-frills HMO 
policy their company has on offer. 
                                                 
19 19 This discussion draws from an analytical report prepared by the Centre for Labour Market Studies, 
Moscow within the framework of Russian- Canadian Project "Women and Labour Market Reform in Russia," 
which was funded by the Canadian International Development Agency and administered by Carleton 
University, Ottawa. For more information about the survey, please contact authors directly.  
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 Yet what does the lack of benefits mean for women in Russia?   What does it mean to 
be working in the old economy, with child care, leave, and other benefits, compared to the 
new economy, with no protection?  To explore this issue, we did some empirical research. 
The Data  
Below we analyze which enterprises are more likely to provide family benefits and the 
impact of family policies, notably maternity leave and provision of child care on the position 
of women in the labour market in 2002 using the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey 
(RLMS). The RLMS is a household-based survey designed as a panel study with a national 
probability sample of 4718 households. It is perhaps the most widely used dataset in the 
study of Russian labor markets (see, for example, Smirnova, 2004; Lehmann and 
Wadsworth, 2000; Lukyanova, 2003; Grogan and Horrocks, 2005).  The data set we use is 
comprised of ten rounds conducted from 1992 to 2002. Rounds I-IV surveyed over six 
thousand households while Rounds V-X surveyed a different panel of approximately four 
thousand households. The data were weighted across the rounds for comparability and to 
ensure that the survey was representative on the national scale.  
The RLMS has some limitations.  Women are asked about leave in a combined way 
which included both maternity and parental leaves. This combination does not allow us to 
separate the effect of these two, very different, types of leave. Another limitation is that data 
about the availability of leave and child care only became available in 2000, while the main 
decline in employment took place in the middle of the 1990s.  At the same time, it has a 
number of strengths.  First of all, it is a longitudinal data set, so we are able to ask women 
about their access to leave and child care in 2000, and then trace the effect of that access in 
subsequent years.  We have a wealth of information not only on conventional income and 
employment variables, but on family composition, the presence or absence of extended 
family members, and variables such as attitudes.  Moreover, the RLMS is collected 
independently from official government agencies so it is not subject to manipulation.  
Finally, it is simply the best publicly-available data set on women’s employment in Russia.   
Enterprise characteristics  
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Public and a number of privatized enterprises often use a system of social benefits, including 
regular paid vacations, paid sick leaves, payment for sanatoria or children's camps, and 
(increasingly rarely) child care, as part of the benefits package. Given the low real monetary 
wages, and the fact that benefits are almost universal for all employees of an enterprise, 
benefits can serve as additional incentives for the employees.  Despite the fact that during the 
transition period, it became possible to obtain social benefit-type services in the market, low 
wages and general pauperization of the population kept the importance of benefits to 
employees high.  
The new private sector in Russia, in turn, is characterized by the much lower level of 
social and legal protection of employees, particularly women. Lacking the social 
infrastructure that allows many public and privatized enterprises to provide benefits at 
moderate expense, new enterprises tend not to offer social benefits, sometimes compensating 
employees through the form of higher wages, sometimes compensating employees through 
informal cash payments or “shadow wages”, and sometimes not compensating employees at 
all.   
 Below we assess the likelihood of provision of social services by different types of 
enterprises, on the example of child care and leave. In Table 1 we provide results of these 
binominal regressions.  The regressions in Table 1 are based on individual employee 
responses to questions about their employer, again using the 2000 RLMS data.  Maternity 
leave and child care were taken as 0/1 dummy variables, with the presence of leave or child 
care taking on the value of one.  The results show that child care services and maternity 
leaves are indeed most likely to be provided by public enterprises and large enterprises – the 
log of enterprise size was highly significant.  Enterprises that have been in existence for 
longer are more likely to provide benefits.  The number of years that an employer has worked 
at the enterprise has a positive effect on the availability of maternity/parental leave and, to a 
much lesser extent, on child care.  It is not clear whether this is because enterprises that retain 
workers offer leave, or whether employees choose to stay with enterprises with more 
generous leave provisions.  Interestingly, education level has a positive (though insignificant) 
effect on access to leave, but no, or a negative effect, on access to child care. 
 Table 1 about here. 
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 The results of Table 1 are important because they allow us to predict what the future 
holds for leave and child care provision in Russia.  The pure public sector now accounts for 
only a quarter of the workforce – 26.7 percent of women and 24.1 percent of men work in the 
public sector according to 1999 CLMS data.  The vast majority work in combined 
private/public enterprises.  If enterprise level provision can be replaced by municipal 
provision or provision through social insurance schemes, then newly emerging public forms 
of provision may cushion women from the negative effects of privatization.  But if not, the 
continuing process of transformation, as new enterprises grow and old enterprises restructure 
and become more like new enterprises, will leave increasing numbers of women without 
benefits.  In the next section of the paper we explore the effect of provision of benefits on 
women’s and men’s employment.  
 
The Model 
The focus of our analysis is how the availability of child care and maternity/parental leaves 
affect women's employment decisions. We model labor supply within a straightforward 
mainstream framework (Francine Blau and Mariane Ferber 2001).  Individuals allocate time 
between market work and leisure by comparing the value of their time in the market and the 
value of their time at home, and will choose to participate in labor if they are offered a 
market wage higher than their  reservation wage (w*), that is  the value the woman places on 
her time at home. 
We hypothesize that wages are determined by so-called human capital:  women with 
more education, more work experience, or higher-skills will receive higher wages, and 
therefore be more likely to be employed.  Non-labor income, including income of other 
household members, increases the reservation wage and therefore decreases the probability 
of employment.  Other factors that will increase the reservation wage are the number and age 
of children, since more or younger children implies a greater need for household production, 
that is, more laundry, more cooking, more shopping, and so on.  Women who have access to 
formal or informal quality child care (other adults in the household to help with child care) 
would be expected to be more likely to be employed. Distance to child care centres may also 
affect women's labour force participation decision. Marital status has an ambiguous effect:  it 
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may increase non-labor income in that women may have access to a husband’s earnings. At 
the same time, it decreases access to state and other benefits, thereby pushing women into 
paid employment.20  
 Another important factor that would affect woman’s employment decisions is 
availability of woman-friendly services and provisions at the workplace. Such provisions 
include maternity and parental leave, paid sick leave, the opportunity to have breastfeeding 
breaks and other provisions allowing women to combine work and family. Policies that allow 
for better balance between work and employment would tend to make employment more 
attractive, therefore increasing female labor force attachment.  However as mentioned above, 
social benefits may decrease women’s attractiveness as workers, lower the monetary wages 
employers will offer women, and thereby reduce labor force participation.  Long leaves may 
also lead to “depreciation of human capital” and therefore lower wages, which would also 
decrease labor force participation.  Even though Russian employers are, in theory, required to 
provide job guarantees to people on leave, realistically it is difficult to believe that employers 
will keep a position open while a person is on a three year (say) parental leave.  One would 
expect the strength of job protection to be inversely related to length of leave.  Other studies 
(e.g. Christopher J. Ruhm and Jacqueline L.Teague 1995) have found that long 
maternity/parental leaves tend to have a negative effect on women’s employment overall, 
whereas studies looking at short leaves of less than a year’s duration have been more likely to 
find a positive effect (e.g. Tommy Ferrarini 2003).  We expect to find similar results for 
Russia.  
 This theoretical framework makes it possible to model a discrete choice between 
employment and non-employment in the labour force given the values of her market and 
reservation wage in contemporary Russia.  The woman's employment decision can be 





BX= −1  
 
where pi is the probability of remaining in employment and  
                                                 
20 There are a number of benefits available in the Russian legislation for single mothers, inaccessible to married 
women.  
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 BX = β0 +Σβi xi  
 
where β’s are the respective coefficients of the explanatory variables, and xi represents a 
vector of characteristics of the individual, her household, and her employer, for example, age, 
education, and whether or not the employer provides child care.  β’s in the logit model 
measure the marginal effects on the log-odds (the log of the odds of working compared to not 
working).  For example, βi   indicates how the log-odds in favor of working change when xi  
is changed by a unit. 
Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
Given that the maternity leave and child care provision data are based on the responses of the 
survey participants about whether their enterprises provide those services, we had to select 
only those women (and men) of official working age (for men 16- 65; for women 16 - 60), 
who participated in the labour force in 2000 either working or being on leave (maternity 
leave, other paid or unpaid leave) in order to avoid an endogeneity problem.  
 The analysis focuses on several categories of women, including mothers with children 
younger than 7 years old, the age at which children start school, mothers with children 
younger than 18 years old and all women with and without children. We also looked at the 
effect of provision of family-friendly services through enterprises on men and on all 
employees.  This was to see whether the effects of family policy pertain only to women or 
they are the simply the characteristics of the enterprises which tend to retain their workers  
 Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the sample.  The dependent variable, 
employment status, was defined as zero if the woman is not working or on leave (maternity 
leave, other paid or unpaid leave), or 1 if the woman was employed.   Around 81 percent of 
the women in our sample were employed in 2002, along with 83 percent of the men.  This 
figure might initially strike one as high.  However, bearing in mind that our initial sample is 
comprised exclusively of people who were employed or on leave in 2000, to have substantial 
numbers of that sample not working two years later suggests that labor market insecurity is 
widespread.  Given the difficulty in distinguishing between discouraged workers who have 
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withdrawn from the labor force and the unemployed, we simply aggregated these two 
categories.  
 The explanatory variables can be divided into enterprise and individual/household 
characteristics. There are several variables which refer to the enterprise-level provision of 
benefits, when the employees were asked in 2000 if their enterprises provided those. 
“Provision of leave” refers to paid leave for pregnancy, giving birth and parental leave.  The 
limitation of this variable is that it does not distinguish between maternity (leave for 
pregnancy and giving birth) and parental leave. Eighty percent of women reported that they 
did have a leave provision, which may be considered either high (most women can access 
leave) or low (given that leave is guaranteed by statute, the number of employed women 
reporting access to leave should be closer to 100 percent than 80 percent). It should be 
stressed that all employed women, including part-time, sessional and seasonal workers, are 
eligible for maternity leave benefits.  “Provision of child care” indicates whether or not the 
respondent has access to free child care in an enterprise's preschool or full or partial payment 
for child care in another preschool institution.  Child care is the least widely available of all 
of the various enterprise level benefits – only around 10 percent of respondents had access to 
child care. Limitations of the data set did not permit the inclusion of other variables 
pertaining to child care characteristics such as care quality and proximity of child care 
centers, or allow us to distinguish between enterprise-provided workplace child care and 
enterprise-subsidized child care elsewhere.  
  “Availability of sanatoria21” refers to full or partial payment by the enterprise for 
sanatoria, children's camps, or tourist camps. Such payments are more common in public and 
large privatized enterprises, which have accumulated a large social infrastructure.  More 
women than men had access to sanatoria; in general the benefit is available to just over one 
third of our sample.  “Paid vacation” and “paid sick leave” are straightforward variables.  
However, as they are highly correlated with the availability of paid maternity/parental leave, 
they were not included in some of the regressions.22
                                                 
21 Sanatoria refer to health resorts, which in most cases are inherited from the Soviet period and available only 
through large industrial or public enterprises.  
22 The high correlation between these variable is due to the fact that maternity leave, paid vacation and paid sick 
leave are considered to be a part of the "benefits package" required to be provided by the law.  If an enterprise 
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  Individual and household characteristics include standard variables such as age and 
level of education, marital status, and number of children.  The majority are married.  The 
marital status dummy includes common law relationships for the purposes of this paper and 
equals to 1 for married or cohabiting, zero otherwise.   About 12 percent of the women in the 
sample have a child under 7.  Over one quarter of the women and less than 20 percent of the 
men in the sample work in managerial or professional positions, which is unsurprising given 
the overrepresentation of women in the health professions in Russia.  Given that our sample 
is comprised entirely of people who are either employed or on leave, and the overall numbers 
on leave are quite small, it is somewhat surprising that only 59.8 percent of men and 45.7 
percent of women worked full-time. Full-time workers are defined as those who worked 40 
or more hours per week at the time of the survey in 2000.   Again, this is an indication of the 
insecurity characterizing the Russian labor market, or possibly that the cut-off for “full-time” 
work in the dataset is quite high.  
  
Results 
 The results of the estimation of the binominal logit (BL) for several categories of 
women and men are presented in Tables 3 and 4. 
 The results for women are presented in Table 3.  Overall, the coefficients on the 
binomial model are significant and in the expected direction.  Maternity/parental leave has, 
interestingly, a strong, positive and significant effect for all women and all mothers, but not 
for mothers of children under 7.  In interpreting the maternity/parental leave results, it is 
important to bear in mind that the maternity/parental variable measures availability of leave 
at the enterprise in 2000.  We can generally assume that women who had leave in 2000 also 
had leave available when their children were small.  This is a reasonable assumption given 
that the average job tenure in Russia within the protected sector is extremely long, so many 
people in the sample are in the same job now as they were when their children were small 
(Lehmann and Wadsworth, 2000).  Also, the overall tend in leave provision is downwards, so 
it is unlikely that many people are moving from a situation when they had no leave 
                                                                                                                                                       
utilizes an informal contracting system and chooses not to provide benefits, it will most likely avoid all benefits.  
Similarly, enterprises that comply with the law may comply with all aspects of the law.  
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provisions when their children were small to one where they worked at enterprises offering 
maternity leave when they had older children.   
The results for all mothers reflect the combined impacts of the old and new 
maternity/parental leave programs.  Comparing the results for all mothers with the results to 
new mothers, it seems that maternity/parental leave has a strong positive effect on the 
probability of employment only for mothers of older children, that is, only for people who 
experienced the pre-transition maternity leave program.  We hypothesize these mothers used 
leave provisions and then returned to their employers, hence leave provisions allowed them 
to keep, maintain and build labor market attachment.  The positive effect of maternity leave 
on all women can be seen as, in part, a reflection of the impact on mothers (recall that the “all 
women” category includes women with adult children).  Also, provision of leaves can be 
seen as a characteristic of workplaces/enterprises, which tend to retain workers. Hence there 
may be a positive effect of leave provision on employment of women without children as a 
result of their employment on such enterprises.  As mentioned, these enterprises are most 
likely to be state or newly privatized enterprises.   
Mothers of children under 7 are less likely to be employed if they have access to 
leave provisions.  This may be simply because they are still on leave and have yet to return to 
the work place. Alternatively, it may be that the new maternity/parental leave provisions are 
less conducive to women’s return to employment than the leave system mothers of older 
children experienced.  Another part of the explanation comes from the fact that younger 
workers are more likely to work under an informal contract at private enterprises willing to 
exchange access to benefits in return to jobs and higher salaries. 
 Child care, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, has a strong positive effect for all women, 
but not for mothers or mothers of young children.  It is likely that we are picking up an effect 
of provision being available historically at certain types of enterprises, that is, public 
enterprises or privatized enterprises.   The enterprises that provide child care may simply be 
different in ways that makes them more likely to retain workers.  
 Education consistently has a positive and significant effect on the probability of 
employment.  The age/participation profile generally fits a quadratic pattern for women and 
for all mothers.  However for mothers with children younger than 7, although age does 
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appear have a first positive and then negative effect on the probability of participation, the 
coefficients are not precisely estimated.  
 There are a number of standard reasons why we might expect to see a non-linear 
age/employment relationship, for example, as younger people finish their schooling and 
accumulate experience they are more likely to become employed, as older workers age and 
experience health problems they are more likely to drop out of the labor force.  In Russia, 
however, there is an additional dynamic going on.  As private sector firms have expanded, 
they have hired predominantly younger workers.  For example, women between 16 and 35 
represent more than a third (37.9 percent) of all women employed in the private sector, as 
opposed to only 24.3 percent of women in the public sector.23  Private sector employers may 
prefer younger workers because their attitudes and expectations, for example, willingness to 
accept risk, are consistent with the new Russian economy, rather than being shaped by 
Soviet-era expectations.24  Or it may simply be most firms, in Russia or elsewhere, tend to 
choose young workers when hiring, and private sector firms hire more new workers than 
public sector firms.  An additional explanation, as suggested earlier, is that private firms hire 
younger workers because they are more likely to agree to work under an informal contract.    
 Household characteristics in general do not appear to have strongly significant effects 
on female employment decisions but affect employment for some women.   The number of 
other adults (usually pensioners) in the household has a strong significant positive effect on 
the employment of mothers, but essentially no effect on the employment of women in 
general.  One explanation of this finding is that the availability of household members to look 
after children, especially school-age children, frees women to enter employment.  However 
women often live in extended family situations because they are unable to afford, or unable 
to obtain, an apartment of their own.  Hence the presence of other adults in the household 
may be proxying lower levels of household income, or urban residence.  However since we 
control for other household income, this should not be a factor. 
 We controlled for the presence children in the household in a variety of ways.  First, 
we included a dummy variable to indicate the presence of children under 7.  This does not 
                                                 
23 The discussion is based on the analytical report prepared by the Centre for Labour Market Studies, 2000, 
Moscow 
24 The Soviet-era employment contract could sometimes be summarized as “I’ll pretend to work, you’ll pretend 
to pay me.” 
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have any significant effect on the employment of any category of women and men.  However 
a variable controlling for the number of children under 7 squared had a significant (at p=0.1) 
negative effect on employment.   Having a baby under 1 year old, as expected, has a strong 
negative relationship with female employment, which is equally strong for all categories of 
women.   
 Marital status has a consistently negative relationship with female employment and is 
the most significant for mothers with children under 7 years old.  It is not clear exactly what 
drives this relationship.  It could be that women do not need to work if they have access to a 
husband’s income; however we control for other household income, so this should not be a 
primary factor.  Possibly the increasingly familial values which appear in the Russian society 
mean that women face pressure from friends and family members to stay at home when they 
are married.  It is also possible that employers discriminate against married women, either 
being reluctant to hire married women or offering married women lower wages.   
 Professional characteristics, including being in a professional or managerial position 
or years of work experience do not produce any consistent or significant results for women. It 
may be explained by the fact that a growing female workforce is concentrated in the low paid 
spheres, such as light industry, healthcare and education, also having controlled for education 
may make being in a professional position insignificant.  
 To test to see whether the effect of leave and other provisions was simply capturing 
enterprise level effects, we ran our employment regression for men and for all workers.  The 
results are reported in Table 4.  To separate out male and female effects in the combined 
regression, we interacted a number of variables (marital status, children under 7, presence of 
post-work adults, age, experience, child care, and so on) with the male dummy variable.  If a 
variable affects men and women differently, the interaction with the male dummy variable 
will be significant.  So, for example, the coefficients on marriage or children under 7 
interacted with the male dummy are strongly positively significant and positive, showing 
marriage and children affect men and women very differently.  Women are pulled out of 
employment; men are not. Interestingly, too, the coefficient on the age*male interaction 
variable is negative and significant, suggesting that the age/employment profile slopes 
upwards less steeply for men than it does for women. 
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 Yet again the fact that we get a positive – although insignificant – coefficient on child 
care in the male equation, and a positive one in the overall equation, makes us think that the 
significance of leave and child care provisions may be a characteristic of the workplaces 
retaining workers.   Further, such variables as payments for sanatoria and paid vacation (a 
variable that is highly correlated with the leave variable) produce positive significant 
coefficients for men as well that again, confirmed a hypothesis of workplace characteristics.  
 
Conclusion 
      
The Russian labor market has, historically, allowed women to combine employment and 
motherhood. It was achieved through provision of such policies as leave and child care 
among others. Our results have shown that, overall, mothers of older children – women who 
had children in the 80s and early 90s – working at enterprises that offer leave are more likely 
to stay employed.  Women with children under 7 appear to drop out temporarily as a result of 
leave policies.  Further research, and more waves of data, are required to determine the 
longer-term effect of leaves on these women.   
Yet the types of enterprises which offer benefits as part of the compensation package 
– large, well-established, public enterprises – are in decline in Russia.   Unfortunately 
enterprise child cares have not been replaced, to any appreciable extent, by privately-
provided child cares.  Newly-emerging private enterprises frequently offer informal contracts 
and shadow wages, and leave benefit provision to the government, making the minimum 
possible contribution to familial policies at the state level. Neo-liberal theory would suggest 
that the enterprises which do not provide excessive benefit packages would be more 
competitive and would retain their workers.  However we do not see this in the data:  people 
without benefits are less likely to be employed in subsequent years.  Perhaps this has to do 
with the volatility of the new private sector, the competition for jobs within that sector and 
high turnover.   
 The policy implications of these findings are that Russia needs to develop a well 
functioning market economy, stronger civil society, judicial system, and a social insurance 
system financed through general taxation.  In addition, as suggested, the development of 
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other schemes of family services provision, such as municipal and through social insurance 
system, may help reducing negative effects of privatization for women.   
Yet ultimately the answer to the question posed at the beginning of the paper remains 
a puzzle.  We suggested that maternity and parental leave, together with contraction of child 
care, are part of a set of policies designed to encourage women to leave the labor force and 
have children.  In our research we found that family policies do not seem to have their 
intended effect:  employed women with access to these benefits appear to be more likely, 
overall, to stay employed.  Yet by studying only women who are employed in 2000 we miss 
another possible route by which family policies can affect labor force participation.  Perhaps 
family policies are pushing women into the home by making employers reluctant to hire 
women in the first place.  More research is needed to capture the total effect of family 
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Table 1: Regression results: likelihood of provision of maternity leave and child care 
facilities by enterprises, 2000a 
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Variables Maternity leave Child care 
 B SE B SE 
Public enterprise dummy 1.8518***     .2482 .7081***      .1744   
Years of operation of 
enterprise 
.0150***      .0069    .0014          .0022 
Years worked at this 
enterprise  
.1640***      .0380   .0296      .0198    
Log of the enterprise size  .6238***      .1626   .5624***      .0992   
Years of work at the 
enterprise (squared) 
-.0038***     .0011   -.0007      .0006    
Educational level  .0728**      .0468    -.0154      .0244     
Enterprise size    .09E-05***  1.398E-05    
Constant -2.0325***    .6540    -3.5559***    .4027   
*** significant at p=0.01, ** significant at p=0.05, *significant at p=0.10  
Source: calculated by authors using Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey individual data.   
a. Overall goodness of fit of the model: 
-2 Log Likelihood      544.508 
 Goodness of Fit       1794.032 
 Cox & Snell - R^2         .209 
 Nagelkerke - R^2          .401 
 
Table 2 - Summary table  
Variables All (men 
and 
women) 








 N % N % N % N % n % 
Total (each 
category) 




3059 82.3 1438 83.4 1621 81.3 1274 82.9 166 70.9 
On leave in 
2002 
121 3.3 19 1.1 102 5.1 97 6.3 44 18.8 
In the labour 
force (working 
or on leave) 
3180 85.5 1457 84.5 1723 86.4 1371 89.3   
Not working in 
2002 
539 14.5 268 15.5 271 13.6 165 10.7 24 10.3 




385 10.4 166 9.6 219 11.0 174 11.3 19 8.1 
Provision of 
leave 
n/a  n/a  1605 80.5 1246 81.1 186 79.5 
Sanatorium at 
enterprise  
1362 36.6 574 33.3 788 39.5 632 41.1 78 33.3 
Provision of 
paid vacation  
3139 84.4 1427 82.7 1712 85.9 1326 86.3 197 84.2 
Provision of 
paid sick leave  
3128 84.1 1426 82.7 1702 85.4 1316 85.7 197 84.2 
Public 
enterprise 
2443 65.7 1042 60.4 1401 70.3 1073 69.9 154 65.8 
Individual and household characteristics 
Full time work 
2000 
1943 52.2 1032 59.8 911 45.7 686 44.7 77 32.9 




































847 22.8 295 17.1 552 27.7 408 26.6 55 23.5 
Holding 
second job 
177 4.8 67 3.9 110 5.5 93 6.1 11 4.7 
Marital status 2852 76.7 1468 85.1 1384 69.4 1166 75.9 187 79.9 
Presence of 
babies under 1 




407 10.9 162 9.4 245 12.3 234 15.2   
* mean, ** median 
Source: Summary figures calculated by authors using Russian Longitudinal Monitoring 
Survey individual data. 
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Table 3 - Results of the estimation of binominal logit (part 1) 
Variables Women Mothers Mothers with 
children younger 
than 7 
 B SE B SE B SE 
Years of education 2002 .0847***      .0285    .0724**      .0385    .1918**      .092
2    
 Respondent's age .2733 ***     .0350   .2393***      .0781    .1506      .194
3     
Age squared -.0034***     .0004   -.0028***      .0010    -.0018      .002
7     
Marital status dummy 2002 -.2104    .1485    -.2804      .1972    -1.0566 **    .561
8    
Years of experience 2000 -.0029      .0083     .0178      .0131    .0350      .042
6     
Dummy for children under 7 2002 .1328      .3136     .3103      .3427      
Provision of child care 2000 .4117*      .2541    .3026      .2977    -.0075      .715
3     
Other household income -1.8E-05*  1.071E-
05    
-1.7E-05  1.188
E-05    
-1.9E-05  2.67
5E-
05     
Other adults 2002 .0988      .1526     .7106**        .3813 .6594      .622
6    
Dummy for 
managers/professionals 2000 
.1094      .1784     .1893      .2191    -.6537      .521
9    
 Number of children under 7 
squared 
-.3084*      .1977    -.3419*      .2128      
Availability of sanatorium 2000 .2028*      .1523    .1759      .1845    -.1495      .408
9     
Babies under 1 2002 -3.9502***    .6150   -3.8612***      .6224   -3.5945***    .702
4   
Provision of leave 2000 .3239***      .1641    .4212***      .1968    -.2525      .538
3     
*** significant at p=0.01, ** significant at p=0.05, *significant at p=0.10 
Source: RLMS 
Table 4 - Results of the estimation of binominal logit (Part 2) 





SE B SE 
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Years of education 2002 .0624***      .0193   .0519**      .0272    
Respondent's age .2208***      .0236 .1053***      .0344    
Age squared -.0027***      .0003     -.0016***  .0004   
Marital status dummy 2002 -.3297***      .1338    .7111***     .1856   
Years of experience 2000 -.0001      .0079     .0061      .0080     
Dummy for children under 7 2002 -.3715**      .2059    .0823      .3602     
Provision of child care 2000 .4077*      .2433    .1418      .2695 
Other household income -4.8E-06  4.340E-06   -1.8E-06  5.290E-06    
Pensioners 2002 .0091      .1373     -.0835        .1787   
Dummy for 
managers/professionals 2000 
.1563      .1605     .1245         .2227 
Number of children under 7 
squared 
-.1953***     .0920    -.0193      .1513     
Availability of sanatorium 2000 .1999      .1435    .3177**      .1693    
Provision of paid vacation .4025***      .1658    .1712        .1845   
Male dummy (m=1) interacted 
with: 
    
m*provision of paid vacation      -.1625      .2333       
m* Availability of sanatorium 
2000 
.1040      .2237       
m*managers/professionals 2000    -.0548      .2529       
m*Years of experience 2000        .0059      .0111       
m*children under 7 2002    .8679***      .3243      
m*Marital status 2002 .9358***      .2194     
m* postwork adults -.0234      .2186       
m*Respondent's age    -.0118**      .0061      
m*Provision of child care 2000      -.2502      .3672       
*** significant at p=0.01, ** significant at p=0.05, *significant at p=0.10 
Source: calculated by authors using Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey individual data.   
a - Baby under 1 - men were not asked that question 
b Provision of maternity leave  - men were not asked that question 
c - Paid vacation, paid sick leave and paid maternity leave and public enterprise - highly 
correlated variables - could include only one of those in each regression 
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